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Abstract 
This paper considers a set of presupposition triggers including focus, questions, 
‘contrastive’ statives, and an ‘affirmation/negation’ construction involving and 
not, where presuppositions are cancelable.  It is proposed that these constructions, 
rather than having strict semantic presuppositions,  have representations involving 
alternative sets in the sense of alternative semantics of questions and focus, and 
that a default process generates a presupposition from the alternative set.   
Presupposition projection facts are dealt with by stating a default constraint 
referring to dynamic denotations. The analysis can be extended to other 
constructions and lexical items with defeasible presupposition triggering behavior, 
such as inchoatives, by hypothesizing a representation involving alternatives.  
 
1. Introduction 
Previous research has identified presupposition triggers and classes of 
presupposition triggers for which the triggering behavior is relatively weak and 
context-dependent. For instance Karttunen (1969) and Stalnaker (1974) discussed 
the fact that while discover displays presupposition-triggering behavior as in (1), 
this can be obviated by the discourse or sentence context, and is sensitive to 
factors such as indexicality which can make the presuppositional reading 
implausible, as shown in (2).  I call presupposition triggers with this relatively 
weak and context-dependent behavior soft presupposition triggers.  
(1)    If John discovers Mary is having an affair, he may sell her motorboat. 
(2)    a. Did you discover that you had not told the truth? 
b. If I discover later that I have not told the truth, I will confess it to 
everyone. 
The goal of this paper is to motivate and develop an analysis of certain soft 
triggers which exploits alternatives in the sense of alternative semantics for 
questions and focus (Hamblin 1973, Rooth 1985).  The basic hypothesis is that 
these soft triggering constructions (which include questions and focus) contribute 
sets of alternative propositions, without contributing anything which amounts to a 
semantic presupposition.  Instead, there is a process which generates a 
presupposition from the alternative set.   This provides for a parameterization of 
the semantics, where the presupposition may be present or not.  Attention will be 
focused on about half a dozen soft triggers: achievements with preparatory phases, 
inchoatives, contrastive statives, affirmation-negation, verbs of reciprocal and 
accompanied action, questions, and focus. These include a core of constructions 
where the case for the analysis which will be proposed here is relatively strong, 
plus additional ones to which that analysis can be extended. 
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The paper is organized as follows.  The remainder of this introduction reviews 
the soft triggering constructions I will be talking about.   In Section 2, I present an 
approach to soft triggering that I call the basic conjunctive strategy, and argue that 
it can not work without the addition of some kind of semantic structuring.  Section 
3 introduces the analysis using presupposition triggering from alternative sets.   
The approach is first developed for four core constructions: focus, questions, 
affirmation-negation, and contrastive statives.  Then it is extended to other soft-
triggering constructions.  Section 4 considers the issue of compositional filtering 
and transformation of presupposition.  Although these phenomena superficially 
favor a standard approach where presupposition triggering is encoded 
semantically, I will show that triggering from alternatives can be formulated in a 
way which accounts for compositional filtering.  Section 5 corrects a gap in the 
earlier reasoning about focus related to the ‘anaphoric’status of focus.  Section 6 
discusses two alternatives to the theory of Sections 3 and 4, and Section 7 sums up 
the paper.  
To show that a lexical item or construction is a soft trigger in my sense, one 
needs to show that it is a presupposition trigger in the first place, using tests of 
survival and transformation of presuppositions in contexts such as negation and 
conditionals, plus intuitions involving the common-ground interpretation of 
presupposition. Second, one needs to demonstrate ‘softness’, by showing that the 
presupposition can be fairly easily canceled.  In (3), I go through these steps for 
win, which is an achievement with a preparatory phase.
1  In (3a,b) there is an 
intuition that the implication that John participated in the Road Race projects 
through negation and from the if-clause of a conditional.
2  (3c) illustrates 
compositional transformation of a presupposition.   It can easily be understood as 
implying not that John participated in the Road Race, but that if he woke up on 
time, he participated in the Road Race.    
(3)  Achievement with preparatory phase 
a. John didn’t win the Road Race. 
b. If John won the Road Race, he’s got more victories than anyone else in 
history. 
c.  If John woke up on time today, he won the Road Race. 
d. I have no idea whether John ended up participating in the Road Race 
yesterday.  But if he won it, then he has more victories than anyone else in 
history. 
(3d) illustrates that the implication in (3b) that John participated can be 
canceled by a discourse context which explicitly expresses ignorance.  Thus (3a-c) 
are being used to show that the implication that John participated is projected and 
transformed in the way characteristic of presuppositions, while (3d) shows that the 
projected presupposition is cancelable, or in other terms, contextually defeasible.  
Finally, there is an intuition that (3a,b) would typically only be used in a 
conversational context where it is taken for granted that John participated, and 
that (3c) would only be used in a context where it is taken for granted that if John 
woke up on time, he participated.   Here we are checking against our intuitions the 3 
pragmatic interpretation of presupposition as entailment by the common ground 
(Stalnaker 1974).
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Since it is my purpose to distinguish a class of soft triggers from other 
presupposition triggers, it is crucial to contrast the degree of cancelability found 
with the different classes of triggers.    (4) checks the acceptability of a cleft in a 
discourse context which explicitly expresses ignorance about the presupposed 
existential implication.  The combination is odd, if not completely unacceptable.  
(5a) does the same for the presupposition trigger too.  Again, the combination is 
very odd, though I find the variant (5b) a bit better.    
(4)   Cleft 
?? I have no idea whether anyone read that letter.  But if it is John who read it, 
let’s ask him to be discreet about the content. 
(5)  Too  
a. ?? I have no idea whether John read that proposal.  But if Bill read it too, 
let’s ask them to confer and simply give us a yes-no response. 
b.  ? John may or may not have read the proposal.  If Bill read it too, let’s ask 
them to confer and simply give us a yes-no response. 
Throughout the paper, clefts will be used as a core case of a ‘hard’ presupposition 
trigger, where it is impossible or at least relatively hard to cancel the 
presupposition. 
Contrastive statives are predicates such as newcomer, have a green card, and 
bachelor which seem to carry with them contrasting predicates which are not 
merely their complements.  In our insular town, being a newcomer contrasts with 
being an oldtimer.  In many situations, having a green card contrasts with being a 
non-citizen resident without a green card.  Bachelors are contrasted with married 
adult men.   A different but compatible viewpoint is that these predicates describe 
species (the ‘species’ of bachelors, or of newcomers to our town) and implicitly 
refer to a specific genus or superclass (the ‘genus’ of adult men, or residents of 
our town).   These predicates defeasibly presuppose their genus predicates.  (6) 
illustrates this for have a green card.   It is perhaps vague what the genus 
predicate is in this case.  I will take it to be ‘human being who is not a native of 
the USA’.  In most contexts, (6a,b,c) would be understood to imply that she 
satisfies the genus predicate, i.e. she is not a native of the USA.  (6d) illustrates 
compositional satisfaction of the presupposition, by virtue of the if-clause in the 
conditional entailing the genus presupposition of the main clause.   
(6)  Contrastive stative 
 a.  Does she have a green card? 
 b.  She doesn’t have a green card. 
 c.  If she has a green card, we can pay her from the DOD grant. 
 d.  If she’s not a native, she has a green card.  Otherwise she wouldn’t be 
working on the DOD grant.  
Imagine a bar where Thursday is Green Card night, and green card holders are 
greeted in an especially enthusiastic way, and given a free drink.   The 
experienced bartender (perhaps knowing the customer) could use (7a) while 4 
instructing the novice bartender about the policy, without presupposing that the 
customer satisfies the genus predicate.   The same goes for (7b).  This illustrates 
the context-based defeasibility of the genus presupposition. 
(7)  a. She doesn’t have a green card.  She doesn’t get a free drink. 
 b.  If she has a green card, give her a free drink. 
Affirmation-negation is the construction with and not that is illustrated in (8).  
To start with the pragmatic interpretation, there is an intuition that the sentence 
would normally be used only in a context where it is taken for granted that John is 
in one of the cities of Boston and New York.  From one point of view, this is 
surprising.  Assuming that and and not in (8) have their standard Boolean 
interpretations, and taking as given that Boston and New York are non-
overlapping regions of space, (8) is informationally equivalent to (9), which does 
not have the presuppositition of (8).   So, either and not in (8) does not have its 
standard compositional semantics, or there is some indirect route to the 
presupposition. 
(8)  Affirmation/negation 
John is in Boston and not in New York.  
(9)  John is in Boston. 
Example (10) illustrates presupposition projection and transformation for 
affirmation-negation.  While (10a) is simply too awkward to evaluate (presumably 
because of the double negation), the implication that John is in Boston or New 
York projects through the negative predicate in (10b), and from the if-clause of 
the conditional in (10c).   In (10d) there is a conditionalized implication that if 
John is out of town, he is in Boston or New York. 
(10)  a. ??John isn’t in Boston and not in New York. 
  b.  It is doubtful that John is in Boston and not in New York.  
  c.  If John is in Boston and not in New York, his mother will be furious. 
  d.  If John is out of town for the weekend, he is in Boston and not New York. 
An interesting feature of affirmation-negation is that the presence of the 
presuppositional reading is sensitive to the affirmed predicate and the negated one 
being incompatible.  Consider (11a).  The area of Manhattan south of 23
rd St does 
not overlap the area north of 42
nd St, so the affirmed predicate and the negated 
predicate are incompatible.   And (11a) seems to presuppose that the office is not 
between the two streets.  On the other hand, (11b) has affirmed and negated 
predicates which are compatible, and it has no presupposition comparable to the 
presupposition of (11a).  This is one kind of ‘cancellation’ of the presupposition 
of affirmation-negation.  In (12a), cancellation is achieved with a discourse 
structure which justifies a contrast between John (who is permitted to miss the 
meeting) missing it, and Bill (who is not permitted to miss the meeting) missing it, 
without supporting a presupposition that one of them missed it.  (12b) gives 
contrasting data with a cleft.
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(11)   a. The office is south of 23
rd St, and not north of 42
nd  St. 5 
   b. The office is north of 23
rd St, and not west of 5
th Ave. 
(12)   a.  Bill was ordered to be at the meeting, and for John attendance was 
optional.  As it turned out, Bill and not John missed it.  
 b. ? Bill was ordered to be at the meeting, and for John attendance was 
optional.  As it turned out, it was Bill who missed it.   
A variety of multi-agent verbs such as symmetric transfer verbs and verbs of 
accompanied motion have soft presuppositions.   In (13a) and (13b), there is an 
intuition that the implication that Mary crossed the footbridge projects through the 
negation and the conditional.  But this implication can easily be canceled, as 
shown by the sequence in (13c). 
(13)   Accompanied motion 
a. John didn’t accompany Mary across the footbridge. 
b. If John accompanied Mary across the footbridge, they are friends again. 
c.  John didn’t accompany Mary across the footbridge, I know that, because 
he was with me.  Perhaps she didn’t cross it either. 
The transfer implications of (14a) are (i) that John gave up possession of his 
bike, and (ii) that in return, he got possession of some money.   In (14b) and (14c) 
there is an intuition that implication (i) projects through the negation and the 
conditional.   (14d) is an extension of (14c) where implication (i) is cancelled, 
presumably because the sentence suggests that John would not have given up 
possession of the bike in a transaction other than a sale. 
(14)  Symmetric transfer 
a. John got money for his bike. 
b. John didn’t get money for his bike. 
c.  If John got money for his bike, he should pay the electricity bill. 
d. If John got money for the bike he was trying to sell, he should pay the 
electricity bill. 
Turning to the next construction, there is a strong tendency for questions to be 
understood presuppositionally, with (15a) presupposing that someone took Mary’s 
bike.  It is not possible to apply projection tests such as negation and conditional 
contexts, due to the limited distribution of questions in embedded positions.  But 
(15b) seems to imply that someone took Mary’s bike.  This could be taken to 
indicate that the implication that someone took Mary’s bike is projecting through 
the predicate clear and the negation.  (15c) indicates that at least clear with a that-
complement is a presupposition hole, with the cleft presupposition that someone 
took Mary’s bike projecting.   Then (15b) is accounted for by the assumptions that 
the embedded question triggers an existential presupposition, and that also the 
question-embedding clear (together with the negation) is a presupposition hole. 
(15)   Question 
a. Who took Mary’s bike? 
b. It isn’t clear who took Mary’s bike. 
c. It isn’t clear that it is Jennie who took Mary’s bike. 
d. Mary wonders who took her bike. 6 
The tendency for a presuppositional reading of constituent questions is 
however not absolute.  In (16a) and (16b), the second sentence is understood as 
leaving open the possibility that nobody will vote for the speaker.  This is made 
explicit in the third sentence. Similarly, the second sentence in (16c) is understood 
as leaving open the possibility that nobody is available to teach field methods.  
Again, this is made explicit in the third sentence. 
(16)  a. I’ve alienated my colleagues completely. I wonder who will vote for me.        
Probably nobody will. 
b. I’ve alienated my colleagues completely. Who will vote for me? Probably 
nobody. 
c. There’s a severe problem with this schedule.  It’s not clear who is 
available to teach field methods.  Unless I am mistaken, nobody is. 
These data suggest that matrix and embedded questions have a systematic but 
defeasible existential presupposition.  This picture falls between the position that 
constitutent questions are presupposition triggers (e.g. Horn 1972 and Gawron 
2001) and the position that they have no systematic existential presuppositions 
(e.g. Groenendijk and Stokhof 1984, Fitzpatrick 2005).
5  In Groenendijk and 
Stokhof’s logical analysis of the question-answer relation, (17b) comes out as a 
complete answer to the question (17a), not a rejection of a presupposition.
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(17)   a. Who on earth will vote for me? 
b. Nobody will.    
My approach to the question data is to claim that direct and embedded 
questions have no strict semantic existential presupposition.  However, there is a 
default process which generates a presupposition from the semantic representation 
of the question. 
The final soft triggering construction that I would like to consider is 
intonational focus.  In studies of focus, there is an argument about whether the 
semantics of focus involves an existential presupposition.  Chomsky (1972) used 
the informal logical form (18a) for the focus sentence (18b).   This suggests an 
existential presupposition, since definite descriptions have existential 
presuppositions.  
(18)  Focus 
a. the x such that Bill likes x – is John 
   b. Bill likes JohnF. 
 Guerts and van der Sandt (2004) is an extended defense of a presuppositional 
semantics for focus. They describe a presuppositional semantics as a null 
assumption, and point out that projection data like (19) favor a presuppositional 
semantics, because the projection behavior is the same as what one sees with 
semantic presuppositions. Just as the presupposition that Fred has a wife is filtered 
in (19a), they observe, the presupposition that someone stole the tarts is filtered in 
(19b).
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(19)   a.  If Fred has a wife, then Fred’s wife stole the tarts. 
b. If someone stole the tarts, then [Fred’s wife]F stole the tarts. 7 
The point can be strengthened by constructing an example where the 
existential presupposition is conditionalized, rather than completely filtered. In 
(20a), the presupposition that someone opened the vault is weakened to (20b).  
This weakened presupposition might be satisfied because it is taken for granted 
that the Trust Company keeps all its money and valuables in the vault, so that it 
could not be robbed without the vault being opened.   
(20)  a.  If Abner and Lana robbed the Trust Company, then sheF opened the 
vault. 
b.  If Abner and Lana robbed the Trust Company, then someone opened 
the vault. 
c.  If Abner and Lana robbed the Trust Company, then it was she who 
opened the vault. 
Notice that the same conditional weakening is seen with the cleft in (20c).  I 
am assuming that clefts are genuine semantic presupposition triggers.  If we 
hypothesized that also focus is a semantic presupposition trigger, then we would 
have an explanation for the fact that the implication that someone opened the 
vault gets compositionally transformed in the same way in the focus example 
(20b) and the cleft example (20c). 
The presupposition filtering and transformation data look like a strong 
argument that focus triggers a semantic presupposition. But other arguments 
indicate that the semantics of focus can not be anything as strong as an existential 
presupposition, because sometimes the context does not satisfy the constraint on 
context which would follow from an existential presupposition.
8     Here is an 
example and argument from Rooth (1999). A betting contest called a football pool 
is held in the department, where people bet on the outcome of football games.  
Consider the exchange below. 
(21)   A: Did anyone win the football pool this week? 
B: Probably not, because it’s unlikely that MaryF won it, and she’s the only 
person who ever wins. 
The observation is that focus on Mary does not give an existential 
presupposition ‘someone won the football pool’ which projects to the top level.  
This is clear because A’s question indicates that A does not know whether 
someone won, and so it is not common ground that someone won.  In (22), we 
change the example by substituting an it-cleft for intonational focus.  The result is 
quite bad, and this can be attributed to the it-cleft producing a semantic 
presupposition that projects to the top level.  This presupposition is in conflict 
with the first thing that B says, namely probably not, meaning that probably 
nobody won the football pool. 
(22)   A:   Did anyone win the football pool this week? 
B:  #Probably not, because it’s unlikely that it’s MaryF who won it, and 
   she’s the only person who ever wins. 
(23) is a representation for (22) which includes focus interpretation in the 
framework of Rooth (1992).  By virtue of the semantics of focus and of focus 8 
interpretation, Q is constrained to be a set of propositions of the form ‘x won the 
football pool’.  This set is introduced by focus interpretation.  On the analysis that 
Rooth advocates, the operator ‘~’ in (23) does not express an existential 
presupposition, and so there is no semantic presupposition that someone won the 
football pool at any level.  Notice by the way that the scope of the focus is the 
embedded sentence, but focus is justified non-locally, by A’s question. 
(23)  [probably not, because it’s unlikely that [[MaryF won it]~Q]] 
Rooth uses these data as an argument against analyses where intonational 
focus  introduces a semantic existential presupposition.  Instead, he says, focus 
just introduces a set of alternative propositions, which has to find an antecedent in 
the discourse representation.  But why then is there such a strong tendency for 
focus to be understood as conveying an existential presupposition?   Here I will 
take the same line as for questions:  although the semantics for focus does not 
involve an existential presupposition, the semantics for focus does create the 
potential for a default process to generate a presupposition.  
Summing up, in each of the constructions I am calling soft triggering 
constructions, there is an implication which has presuppositional character, 
because it shows the compositional behavior of presuppositions (i.e. certain 
patterns of presupposition projection, filtering, and transformation) and the 
characteristic pragmatic interpretation of presupposition (i.e. a requirement of 
entailment by the common ground).   My strategy in this paper will be to claim 
that the soft triggering constructions do not primitively encode presuppositions.  
Instead, they have a certain semantic property, the property of contributing 
alternatives sets, and this creates the potential for generating a presupposition by a 
default process. 
A different approach is that soft triggers do encode presuppositions lexically 
or constructionally, and that these presuppositions can be turned into assertions by 
local accommodation. This possibility is not to be excluded on my assumptions.  I 
am assuming that there are primitive semantic presupposition triggers (e.g. it-
clefts and too).  And there are constructions and discourse structures, such as the 
one in (24), where there appears to be the equivalent of local accommodation. The 
presupposition of too in the if-clause of (24b) is that someone other than Mary is 
at the climbing wall. In the context (24b), the presupposition can be understood as 
conjoined within the if-clause to the left of the assertion, so that the sentence is 
equivalent to (24c).  So (24b) has the structure of (maximally) local 
accommodation, with the presupposition added in as embedded a position as 
possible.  The situation is similar in example (24d) with conditional morphology. 
(24)   a. I’m worried that John might have gone to the climbing wall. 
 b. Of course if Mary is there too, there’s no reason for concern.  She is 
experienced and safety-conscious. 
 c. If John is at the climbing wall and Mary is there too, there’s no reason 
for concern. 
 d. Of course if Mary were there too, there would be no reason for concern. 9 
So, we need a theory where local accommodation can apply in certain 
circumstances even for hard triggers, or where there are mechanisms that mimic 
accommodation, such ones involving free variables or discourse structure (along 
the lines of von Fintel 1994 and Beaver 2004a).  Given this, there is the possibility 
of analyzing the apparent cancellation of presuppositions with soft triggers using 
local accommodation.  In developing an analysis where also soft triggers are 
primitive presupposition triggers, one has to find an account for the differential 
behavior of hard and soft triggers that was discussed in this section.  Van der 
Sandt and Guerts (2001) investigated this problem in the context of a DRT theory 
of presupposition (van der Sandt 1992).  Although in that theory all 
presuppositions are in a sense anaphoric, hard triggers are distinguished by a 
stricter anaphoricity requirement which is also found with pronouns, van der 
Sandt and Guerts hypothesize.  This harder requirement is resistant to 
accommodation.  So the analysis of the data repeated below is that won triggers a 
presupposition, which in (25a) is locally accommodated at the level of the if-
clause.  The corresponding analysis is not possible for (25b), because the 
pronominal presupposition in (25b) is resistant to local accommodation.     
(25)  a. I have no idea whether John ended up participating in the Road Race 
yesterday.  But if he won it, then he has more victories than anyone else 
in history. 
b. ?? I have no idea whether anyone read that letter.  But if it is John who 
read it, let’s ask him to be discreet about the content. 
Going deeply into van der Sandt and Guerts’ proposal would carry me far 
afield, partly because of the significant differences in framework.   However, I 
believe that it is a viable alternative to the proposal being articulated here. 
 
2.  A basic conjunctive analysis 
Stalnaker (1974) suggested a pragmatic approach to the presupposition-
triggering behavior of know. This analysis is only sketched, it was perhaps offered 
just as an example of the general kind of analysis one should consider, and know 
is not one of the triggers being analyzed in my paper.  But for my purposes it is 
useful to consider a version of the proposal as an introduction to the idea of 
triggering from structured lexical entries. The starting point is the assumption that 
the content of a clause ‘x know p’ can be divided into two conjuncts.  One 
conjunct is the factive component, and the other is a predication attributing a 
propositional attitude to x.   Using the relation symbol K for the attitude, the 
content can be written as p ∧ K(x,p).  The formula K(x,p) is assumed to entail that 
x believes p, and to have additional entailments related to the source of the belief.  
Because the factive component is written as a conjunct, K(x,p) is assumed not to 
entail p.   
Assuming this much, we can reason as follows (Stalnaker 1974:206).   
‘Suppose a speaker were to assert that x knows that P in a context where the truth 
of P is in doubt or dispute.’ Then he would be ‘saying in one breath something 
that could be challenged in two different ways.  He would be leaving unclear 10 
whether his main point was to make a claim about the truth of P’ (i.e. to assert the 
factive conjunct), ‘or to make a claim about the epistemic situation of x’ (i.e. to 
assert the attitude conjunct K(x,p).).  If the speaker did that, he would be violating 
the presumption of being orderly, not confusing the listener, and not violating the 
reasonable expectations of the listener. 
Both the speaker and hearer can be expected to recognize that it would violate 
maxims of conversation to use ‘x knows p’ in a context where both entailments 
are at issue.  The hearer can be expected to infer that the speaker assumes the 
contrary, i.e. that one of the entailments is taken for granted.  This gives a 
pragmatic presupposition that the factive entailment is true, leaving the attitude 
entailment as the speaker’s main point. 
Let us call this strategy for deriving presupposition triggering the basic 
conjunctive strategy (BC).  There are a couple of gaps in the strategy which 
indicate a need for a degree of structuring in the semantic input.  First, we must 
assume that there is some process which pulls the entailments p and K(x,p) out of 
the proposition denoted by ‘x knows p’.  For a given proposition q, except in 
trivial cases there are any number of ways of picking q1 and q2 such that q = q1 ∧ 
q2.  If we are given the proposition q which is denoted by ‘x knows p’, we can not 
uniquely factor q into two propositions q1 and q2 such that q = q1 ∧ q2, in the way 
that the number 14 uniquely factors into two prime numbers 2 and 7.   We have to 
assume that the factive and attitude entailments are given in some way.  One 
possibility is that the two entailments are represented syntactically or 
morphologically.   Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1968) suggested a syntactic structure 
for sentences with know (and generally for factive predicates) which includes the 
noun fact in the complement.  (26) is an example of the syntactic deep structure. 
 
(26)  a. John knows that he is a jerk. 
  b. John knows [fact [that he is a jerk]] 
 
Or it might be plausible to theorize that the verb know is a compound of a null 
predicate FACT with a root √KNOW which has the attitude meaning.  In either case, 
a division between the factive predicate and the attitude predicate is given in 
syntax.    
Alternatively, one could claim that there is a cognitive capacity which makes 
the factive and attitude entailments of know salient.  On this account, it is 
somehow a property of human cognition that when someone entertains the 
proposition ‘x know p’, the two entailments p and K(x,p) pop into consciousness, 
so that they can be used in the pragmatic argument BC.  Or finally, one can 
hypothesize that the semantic value of ‘x knows p’ is given by compositional 
semantics as a set {p,K(x,p)}.  It should be stipulated that this set has a 
conjunctive interpretation, but because it is a set, it makes the factive and attitude 
entailments available.   These are different ways of executing the requirement that 
BC must have access to the factive and attitude entailments of ‘x knows p’.  
Assuming the set of two entailments {p, K(x,p)} is given somehow, there is a 
further problem.   In BC, we hypothesize that it would somehow be confusing and 
uncooperative to communicate the entire formula p ∧ K(x,p) as novel information.  11 
If this problem is resolved if p is in the common ground of information, it seems 
that it could also be resolved if K(x,p) is in the common ground.  So it is not clear 
why p rather than K(x,p) comes out presupposed.
9   
Near-minimal pairs I call Fillmore pairs make this problem worse.  Fillmore 
(1971) pointed out pairs of verbs or constructions which have the same group of 
conceptually distinct entailments, but with different distributions of 
presupposition. Here is a case involving factivity.
10 (27a) and (27b) both have a 
factive implication (Mary and Bill are having an affair) and an attitude implication 
(John believes or has claimed that they are having an affair).  For know, we want 
the factive implication to come out presupposed, and for be right, we want the 
belief implication to come out presupposed, since the data in (28) indicate 
presuppositional status for this implication.   It is difficult to see how one can 
make (27a) and (27b) come out differently, if they have the simple conjunctive 
representation (29), where H is the attitude predicate, or if they just make 
available the pair of entailments {p, H(x,p)}.   
(27)  a. John knows that Mary and Bill are having an affair. 
  b. John is right that Mary and Bill are having an affair. 
(28)   a. John is right that Mary and Bill are having an affair. 
b. Is John right that Mary and Bill are having an affair? 
c. If John is right that Mary and Bill are having an affair, that would explain 
their odd behavior yesterday. 
(29)   p ∧ H(x,p) 
Here is a pair involving one of the soft triggers from  Section 1.  The sense of 
‘x got money for y’ which is illustrated in (30) is close to being a synonym of ‘x 
sold y’. Both have (i) a transfer entailment that there was an event of x transferring 
ownership of y to some z, (ii) a counter-transfer entailment that there was an event 
of z transferring money to x, and (iii) an intensional entailment capturing that x 
and z intend for the two transfers to be in exchange for each other.  It is plausible 
to claim that the conjunction of these entailments capture the content of both ‘x 
got money for y’ and ‘x sold y’.
11 But the two forms show different 
presuppositional behavior.  The data in (30), repeated from Section 1, indicate a 
presuppositional status for the transfer entailment T of (30a), which is stated in 
(30e).   The conditional (30b), the question (30c), and the negated version (30d), 
each have the implication T. 
(30)   a. John got money for his bike. 
b.  If John got money for his bike, he paid the phone bill. 
c.  Did John get money for his bike? 
d.  John didn’t get money for his bike.  
e.  Transfer entailment T 12 
There was transfer of possession of John's bike from John to someone 
else. 
Here are the versions with sold.  (31a) has the entailment T, but this implication is 
not preserved under conditionalization, questioning, and negation in (31b-d).   
Instead, what is preserved is a weaker implication that John owned the bike.    
(31)   a. John sold his bike. 
b.  If John sold his bike, he paid the phone bill. 
c.  Did John sell his bike? 
d.  John didn’t sell his bike.  
So, we have a near-minimal pair consisting of constructions ϕ1 and ϕ2, the 
meaning of which can be expressed as the conjunction of a set of entailments 
{p1,p2,..}.    For ϕ1, a certain conjunction of pi’s has presuppositional status, while 
for ϕ2, a different conjunction of pi’s has presuppositional status.   It is impossible 
to capture these data if the semantic values of both are simply the conjunction 
p1∧p2,… and the process which accounts for presuppositional status can see only 
the semantics of the sentence, because then there is no way of getting different 
results for ϕ1 and ϕ2.  For the same reason it is impossible to capture the data if 
the compositional-semantic component delivers the same conjunctively 
interpreted set {p1,p2,…} for ϕ1 and ϕ2.
12  
I interpret these data showing that, to develop an indirect triggering account 
similar to BC, the triggering process has to have access to some degree of 
structuring of the semantic value, either because the structuring is expressed 
syntactically, or just semantically.
13  Developing an account along these lines is 
the topic of sections 3 and 4.   
It is worth mentioning that using a semantic presupposition operator, it is easy 
to express the presuppositional difference between get money for and sell.  Given 
any set of entailments {p1,p2,…}, we can stipulate that any one of them is a 
presupposition, by hypothesizing a representation like ∂p1∧p2∧…, where ∂ is the 
presupposition operator (Beaver 1995).   This is in one way good, but also shows 
that it is too easy to stipulate the results one wants using a semantic 
presupposition operator.  As explained in Section 6, the theory being developed 
here does better only for the subset of the soft triggers where there is independent 
motivation for a representation involving alternatives.  
3. Triggering from alternative sets 
This section introduces a mechanism for presupposition triggering from 
alternative sets.  The mechanism is first motivated by and applied to focus and 
question data, and then extended to other soft triggering constructions.    
Section 1 reviewed an argument against the hypothesis that focus triggers a 
semantic existential presupposition.   This leaves us with the question of why 
there is such a strong tendency for focus to be understood as associated with an 
existential presupposition.  I suggest this is a secondary effect, related to a role for 13 
focus alternative sets as topical questions.  A representation like (32) with focus 
interpretation contributes a variable Q with the type of a set of propositions, 
according to the analysis of Rooth (1992).
14 The semantics of focus does not 
contribute a presuppositional constraint that the disjunction of Q is true.   
However, pragmatic literature on focus has suggested that the alternative sets 
signaled by focus and topic features can take on the role of question topics, so-
called questions under discussion (Carlson 1983, Roberts 1996, Büring 1997, 
Büring 2003).  And very often, when a question like ‘who read it’ is under 
discussion, it is taken for granted that one of the alternatives is true, i.e. it is taken 
for granted that someone read it.  
(32)   a. [ … [[MaryF read it]~Q] … ] 
b.  Q is a set of propositions of the form ‘x read it’, where x ranges over a 
set of relevant individuals. 
Thus the idea is to derive the existential presupposition of focus in two steps.  
Focus interpretation contributes a semantic object of type 〈〈s,t〉,t〉, which is the 
semantic type of questions.  This object is annotated here as Q.  Secondarily, there 
is a process which interprets an object like this as a topical question which as a 
default satisfies the presuppositional constraint that the disjunction of Q is true.  
As well as deriving the presupposition from a motivated representation for the 
semantics of focus, this gives us an account of why the presupposition of focus 
can be cancelled.  We just have to assume that the secondary process which 
generates the presupposition has a default nature, which is not operative when the 
context of utterance, or other considerations of plausibility, are inconsistent with 
the existential presupposition. 
Let’s consider now presupposition triggering from direct and indirect 
questions.   As reviewed in Section 1, there is a strong tendency for both direct 
questions like (33a) and embedded questions like (33b) to be understood as 
presupposing that someone took Mary’s bike.  This was supported both by 
pragmatic interpretation and by projection tests.   But in the right contexts, the 
existential presupposition of questions can be canceled.  For this reason, both 
direct and indirect questions have the status of soft presupposition triggers. 
(33)   a. Who took Mary’s bike? 
b. It isn’t clear who took Mary’s bike.    
According to Hamblin’s semantics (Hamblin 1973), questions, just like the 
semantic objects contributed by focus, have the semantic type 〈〈s,t〉,t〉. We can 
apply exactly the same logic as for focus–a direct or indirect question contributes 
a semantic object with type 〈〈s,t〉,t〉.
15  This triggers a default presuppositional 
constraint that the proposition formed as the disjunction of the set is true.   
Because this amounts to a presupposition that some alternative in the set is true, I 
will call a presupposition derived in this way the some-alternative presupposition. 
For direct questions, the story seems very plausible–it is probably typical that 
when a speaker uses a direct wh-question, she intends to assume that the question 
has a positive answer, and intends for the listener to recognize this assumption.  14 
So it is natural to claim that for direct wh-questions, the some-alternative 
presupposition is imposed as a discourse-structural default. 
Formally, then, we can treat focus and questions as being subject to the same 
process of generating a presupposition from an alternative set.  There is a 
construction (either a wh-question or focus) which introduces an alternative set Q.  
This is a set of propositions whose specific identity is in part given by 
compositional semantics, and in part constrained pragmatically.  The 
representation triggers a default presupposition that the disjunction ∨Q is true.  
(34) summarizes the steps for a direct question.  
(34)   a. [Who took Mary’s bike] (= Q) 
b.  Q is a set of propositions of the form ‘x took Mary’s bike’, where x 
ranges over a set of relevant people. 
c.  There is a default presuppostion ∨Q, i.e. a default presupposition that 
somebody took Mary’s bike. 
As already discussed, existential presuppositions are also observed for wh-
questions in embedded positions.  In a default context, (35a) seems to presuppose 
the same thing as (35b), that somebody took Mary’s bike.  But one can also tease 
out a different presupposition that Mary believes  someone took her bike.   
Switching the examples, it is clear that a speaker for (36) does not want to imply 
that someone voted against Mary. But because of the first sentence, a 
presupposition that Mary believes someone voted against her is supported.    
(35)   a. Mary wonders who took her bike. 
b. Who took Mary’s bike? 
(36)   Mary incorrectly believes somebody voted against her.  She wonders who 
voted against her / she wonders who. 
This pattern is typical for presupposition triggers in attitude contexts (Heim 
1991). There is an intuition that in a default context, (37a) presupposes that 
someone voted against Mary.  But with the context (37b), this is weakened to 
Mary believing that someone voted against her.   
(37)  a.  Mary believes it is Chris who voted against her.  
b. Mary  incorrectly  believes  somebody voted against her.  Mary believes 
it is Chris who voted against her. 
c.  It is Chris who voted against Mary. 
In Heim’s study of presupposition projection in attitude contexts (Heim 
1991), a compositional rule is stated which predicts that (37a) presupposes that 
Mary believes someone voted against her, by virtue of (37c) semantically 
presupposing that someone voted against Mary.  This suggests the following 
strategy for deriving a presupposition from the complement of wonder. 
(i) By virtue of the embedded question denoting an alternative set Q, a default 
presupposition ∨Q  is generated.  
(ii) Some additional process produces the transformed presupposition that 
Mary believes someone voted against her. 15 
Part (i) is triggered by the presence of a construction which contributes a 
semantic object of type 〈〈s,t〉,t〉, in this case the complement question.  This part of 
the account should be developed in a way which covers the embedded question in 
(35a), the direct question (34a), and the focus structure (32a) in exactly the same 
way.   Part (ii) has no counterpart in the examples discussed so far, because it is 
clear that it involves some kind of interaction between the indirect triggering 
mechanism and compositional semantics.  Working out an account which satisfies 
the requirement (ii) is the topic of Section 4. 
There is another point about (37b).  So far, I said that the some-alternative 
presupposition was associated with a proposition set taking on the role of a 
question under discussion.  It seems doubtful, though, whether the question ‘who 
voted against Mary’ is under discussion at the global level in this example, 
because the first sentence already indicates that nobody did.   Perhaps one could 
appeal to a notion of a question being ‘under discussion’ in a hypothetical context.  
While I don’t think that direction of analysis is absurd, in Section 4 I will drop 
reference to the QUD construct, and refer simply to the logical type of the 
semantic object which triggers the default presupposition.    
The next construction to be considered is affirmation-negation.  Section 1 
presented evidence that the and not construction in (38a) contributes a defeasible 
presupposition that John is in Boston or New York.  It was pointed out that this is 
in a way puzzling, because assuming a Boolean semantics for and and not, and 
taking for granted that Boston and New York are disjoint areas of space, (38a) 
carries the same information as (38b). 
(38)  a. John is in Boston and not New York. 
  b.  John is in Boston. 
There is a certain similarity between the focus data and affirmation-negation.  
(39a) repeats an example which demonstrates compositional transformation of a 
focus presupposition.  It seems that one can understand the presupposition to be 
either (39b), or the weaker (39c).  Presumably, we get the stronger presupposition 
if we take the salient alternatives to Lena to be just Abner and Lena, and the 
weaker presupposition if also other individuals are alternatives to Lena.  Notice 
now that the presupposition of the affirmation-negation sentence (39d) is precisely 
the stronger of the two options for the focus sentence, namely the presupposition 
(39b).  This suggests that the presupposition of (39c) comes from the affirmation-
negation construction (39d) somehow contributing the alternative set (40). 
(39)   a. If Abner and Lena robbed the trust company, then sheF opened the vault. 
b. If Abner and Lena robbed the trust company, then Lena or Abner opened 
the vault. 
c. If Abner and Lena robbed the trust company, then someone opened the 
vault. 
d. If Abner and Lena robbed the trust company, then Lena and not Abner 
opened the vault.  
(40)  {λw.openw(Abner,v), λw.openw(Lena,v) }   (The set containing two 
propositions ‘Abner opened the vault’ and ‘Lena opened the vault’.) 16 
The most direct route to the alternative set would be to assume the denotation 
(41a) for and not.   I use an operator written with three dots and a double bar that 
in this case introduces a two-element alternative set.  In general, the notation ‘ϕ∶ 
ψ1 ∥ … ∥ ψn ’ is understood as ‘ϕ, with the alternative set {ψ1 ,…, ψn} introduced.’  
The term ϕ names the ordinary denotation, while after the vertical dots ‘∶’ there 
are terms ψi naming the alternatives, separated by ‘∥’.   So in (41a), the body of the 
lambda expression is understood as ‘P(x), with the alternative set {P(x),P(y)} 
introduced’.  With this denotation for and not in example (39d), the propositional 
alternative set (40) gets introduced.  Using triggering from alternative sets, this 
triggers a default presupposition which is the disjunction of the alternative set, i.e. 
(41b).  This is not quite right, because we want the transformed presupposition 
(39b).   But as shown in the next section, it is the right start.
16 
(41)   a. λyλxλP[ P(x) ∶ P(x) ∥  P(y) ] 
b.  Abner opened the vault or Lena opened the vault. 
The denotation (41a) is however too weak, because it does not explain why 
(42a) is contradictory.  Here there is a contrast with the focus example (42b).  
Clearly, what is wrong with (41a) is that the standard content (ignoring the 
alternative set) does not entail ¬P(y).  In (42c), this is fixed by adding ¬P(y) as a 
conjunct.  (42d) gives the semantics of and not combined with its three 
arguments. 
(42)  a.  Abner and not Lena read the letter.  And perhaps Lena read it too. 
b.  AbnerF read the letter.  And perhaps Lena read it too. 
c.〚and not〛= λyλxλP[ P(x) ∧ ¬P(y) ∶ P(x) ∥  P(y) ] 
d.〚and not〛 (y) (x)(P)  = P(x) ∧ ¬P(y), with the alternative set {P(x), P(y)} 
introduced. 
The denotation (42c), which introduces an alternative set, interacts in the 
required way with presupposition triggering from alternatives.  It also has the 
advantage of being close to a standard Boolean interpretation for and and not.  
  Here is a twist on the analysis.  We assume the straightforward Boolean 
meaning for and not, i.e (42c) minus the introduction of the alternative set. Instead 
of stipulating the alternative set, we treat it as being derived discourse-
structurally.  The idea is that affirmation-negation instantiates a rhetorical pattern 
of affirming one alternative, and negating the others.  When a sentence with and 
not is interpreted as an instance of the rhetorical pattern, the alternative set is 
indirectly identified.       
The next construction I would like to look at is contrastive statives.  By now 
the plot is clear.  I would like to claim that contrastive statives inherently ‘carry 
along’ their contrasting terms, e.g. for newcomer, the contrasting term oldtimer 
and, since a resident may be neither a newcomer nor an oldtimer, middletimer.   
(43) puts this into a lexical entry.  A free parameter y is included, whose value 
might be our town (the town of Ovid in upstate New York).  This inclusion of a 17 
free parameter follows the analysis of phrases like a local bar in Mitchell (1986).  
(44) shows how an example should work out. In (44b), the part after the dots 
introduces an alternative set {newcomer(p,o),  middletimer(p,o), oldtimer(p,o)}. 
The presupposition is generated as the disjunction of this alternative set, which we 
can assume to be resident(p,o). 
(43)  〚newcomer〛= λx[newcomer(x,y) ∶ newcomer(x,y) ∥  middletimer(x,y) 
∥    oldtimer(x,y)] 
(44)  a. Paul is no newcomer.  
  b. ¬[newcomer(p,o) ∶ newcomer(p,o) ∥ middletimer(p,o) ∥    oldtimer(p,o)] 
One point about contrastive statives may be of significance to the theory of 
presupposition triggering.  Arguably, the opposition between newcomers and 
oldtimers is primitively a sociological and cognitive opposition, not a linguistic 
one.   The lexicon of English alludes to this distinction, but it does not seem quite 
right to claim that the distinction is stipulated in the lexicon of English as a 
semantic presupposition.   From this point of view, the representation (43) is 
perhaps preferable to one like (45) with a semantic presupposition.
17 
(45)   〚newcomer〛= λx[∂resident(x,y) ∧ newcomer(x,y)] 
Also, the Green Card Night scenario from Section 1 suggests that the 
contrasting terms evoked by contrastive statives can be context dependent.  This 
has a natural place in the alternatives theory, but it is harder to see where to locate 
it in a theory using lexical semantic presuppositions.
18 
At this point, triggering from alternative sets has been applied to focus, direct 
and indirect questions, the affirmation-negation construction, and contrastive 
statives.   For each of them, there is some kind of case that the independently 
motivated semantics or pragmatics of the construction involves alternative sets, 
though certainly analyses without alternative sets are possible, such as the 
partition semantics in the case of questions.  While an analysis of these 
constructions using semantic presuppositions plus some mechanism (such as local 
accommodation) for eliminating the presupposition has not been refuted, I have 
made a case that the alternatives analysis is a better match for what is known or 
believed about the grammar and semantics of these constructions.  Assuming this 
much, there is the possibility of analyzing other soft presupposition triggers using 
triggering from alternative sets, rather than with a direct lexical encoding of a 
semantic presupposition.  I will work this out for inchoatives. 
Let us return for a moment to affirmation-negation.  Consider example (46a), 
as used by a nurse with reference to her work shift.  Intuitively, the sentence 
presupposes that the patient was asleep at the start of the shift.  This is supported 
by projection data in (46b), where the presupposition is either preserved, or 
transformed into a presupposition that the nurse believes the patient was asleep. 
(46)  a. The patient was asleep and then awake, and not asleep the whole time. 
b. The nurse doubts that the patient was asleep then awake and not asleep 
the whole time. 18 
In the analysis I proposed, presupposition triggering is attributed to the and 
not phrase contributing an alternative set.  The individual alternatives can be 
described using a logic of change interpreted in an interval semantics.  Following 
Dowty (1979), sentences and formulas of the logic of change have truth values 
relative to intervals, and stative sentences are true relative to an interval iff they 
are true at every point in the interval.  This makes the atomic formula (47a) an 
adequate representation of ‘the patient was asleep the whole time’, where z1 
designates the patient.  In (47b), change of state is represented using the operator 
T ‘and then’ from von Wright (1968).
19  The alternative set then is (47c).  As we 
want, the disjunction of the alternatives entails that the patient was asleep at the 
start of the reference interval, something that can be expressed with (47d). 
(47)   a. asleep(z1) 
b. asleep(z1) T awake(z1) 
c. { asleep(z1) T awake(z1), asleep(z1) } 
d.  asleep(z1) T z1 = z1 
The point of going through this is that the examples (46a,b) are close to being 
paraphrases of the inchoative sentences (48a,b).  The two versions are nearly 
equivalent in their assertions.
20  And as reviewed in Section 1, change-of-state 
sentences have their pre-states as soft presuppositions.  (48b) is a projection 
example comparable to (46b), where the implication that the patient was awake at 
the start of the shift survives embedding under the negatative verb doubt.
21 
(48)   a. The patient woke up. 
b. The nurse doubts that the patient woke up. 
So, the particular assertion-negation complex in (46) is effectively a 
compositionally constructed inchoative, which not only has the right assertion, but 
also exhibits the soft triggering behavior of inchoatives.  Assuming that the 
alternatives analysis of assertion-negation is right, this suggests the possibility of a 
lexical analysis of inchoatives as introducing alternatives.  All that is required is a 
lexical entry for the inchoative which contributes the alternatives which are 
contributed by assertion-negation in (46).  (49a) is the definition of an inchoative 
operator describing a transition from the subject not being in the state described 
by the predicate, to the subject being in that state.  If we assume that the 
inchoative suffix –en denotes inc, as indicated in (49b), then we get (49d) as the 
semantics for (49c).   (50a) modifies the inchoative operator to include an 
alternative set, resulting in the semantics (50b) for (49c).   The disjunction of the 
alternatives is equivalent to (50c).   So to presuppose the disjunction is to 
presuppose that the sky was black at the start of the interval of evaluation. 
(49)  a.  inc = λPλx .¬P(x) T P(x) 
  b.  [[black–en]] =  [[–en]]( [[black]]) = inc(black)  
  c.   The sky blackened. 
  d.  ¬ black(s) T black(s) 
(50)  a.  inc = λPλx .¬P(x) T P(x) ∶ ¬P(x) T P(x) ∥ ¬P(x) 
  b.  [¬ black(s) T black(s) ∶ ¬ black(s) T black(s)  ∥ ¬ black(s) ]  19 
  c.  ¬ black(s) T s=s 
There is an advantage in putting the introduction of alternatives into the 
inchoative, because this predicts that any verb formed from this operator is a soft 
trigger.  A language learner does not have to learn independently that each 
inchoative is a soft trigger, she just has to learn its morphology.  Admittedly that 
this kind of advantage can be obtained with other analyses of the triggering 
properties of inchoatives, e.g. we could try to write a semantic presupposition into 
the inchoative operator, perhaps using the definition (51).
22   
(51)  inc = λPλx .  (∂¬P(x)) T P(x) 
Summing up, this paper has claimed that an analysis using triggering from 
alternatives is motivated for focus, direct and indirect questions, affirmation-
negation, and contrastive statives.  If we observe soft triggering behavior for 
another construction, lexical item, or class of lexical items (call it X), and can 
identify an alternative set whose disjunction is the desired presupposition, then 
hypothesizing a representation with an alternative set is a way of producing a 
defeasible presupposition for X.  The case for analyzing the construction using 
triggering from alternatives will be stronger if there is independent motivation for 
the alternative set.  But even if there isn’t such independent motivation, the 
analysis using triggering from alternatives has the advantage of predicting soft 
triggering behavior. 
Consider how this works out for the transfer construction in the example 
repeated in (52a).  Assume the content of (52) is expressed with the conjunctive 
formula (52b), where T(j) is the transfer entailment and C(j) is the countertransfer 
entailment.  Then we can get the transfer entailment to come out as a soft 
presupposition by stipulating the alternative set (52c), because of the Boolean 
logic (52d).  The appropriate alternative is simply John giving up his bike without 
getting money. 
(52)  a. John got money for his bike. 
  b.  T(j) ∧ C(j)  
  c.  {T(j) ∧ C(j), T(j) ∧ ¬ C(j)} 
  d.  [T(j) ∧ C(j)] ∨ [T(j) ∧ ¬ C(j)]  ≡ T(j) 
This analysis has revealed a problem: it turns out to be too trivial to identify 
an alternative set which produces the right presupposition. Suppose we have a 
construction or lexical item with an observed presupposition p and assertion q.   If 
we stipulate a binary alternative set {p ∧ q, p ∧ ¬q}, then by propositional logic 
the disjunction of the alternatives is equivalent to p.   On this basis, it is possible 
to stipulate any desired presupposition, and the fact that the presupposition is to be 
generated from an alternative set provides no constraint at all.  So for 
constructions where there is no independent motivation for the representation with 
alternatives, generating the presupposition from alternatives is just a way of 20 
representing the softness of the triggering.   I discuss this problem further in 
Section 6. 
   
4.  Compositional interactions 
There is a group of observations about presupposition projection which are 
considered characteristic of semantic presupposition, first because these effects 
show up with clear cases of semantic presupposition, and second because 
systematic accounts of them have been given in compositional semantic accounts 
(Karttunen 1973, 1974, Karttunen and Peters 1979, Heim 1983, Beaver and 
Krahmer 2001, Schlenker 2006).  One case is the transformation of 
presuppositions in conditionals which served as a test for presupposition in 
Section 1. In isolation, (53) presupposes that John has twins; this presupposition q′  
comes from the definite description.
  In a conditional context (54), the 
presupposition q′ is transformed to p→q’, where p is the assertion of the if-clause 
(in this case, that John has children).
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(53) Mary does not like John’s twins. 
> John has twins.  (presupposition q′ ) 
(54) If John has children, then Mary will not like his twins. 
> If John has children then he has twins. (presupposition p→q′) 
This transformation of presuppositions is captured in a dynamic compositional 
account using semantic presuppositions (Heim 1983), accounts using three-valued 
valuations (Beaver and Krahmer 2001) and in Schlenker’s account using 
incremental evaluations in a static two-valued system (Schlenker 2006). The 
potential problem for my analysis is that, as we already saw in Section 1,  when 
we check similar examples with soft triggers, the data come out in the same way, 
with conditional weakening of the presupposition. Here is an example with and 
not.  The clause in (55) presupposes that John is in Syracuse or Binghamton.  In 
(56), this clause is embedded as a main clause in a conditional. 
(55) John is in Syracuse and not Binghamton. 
 >  John is in Syracuse or in Binghamton. 
(56) If John is in a city, he is in Syracuse and not Binghamton. 
> If John is in a city, he is in Syracuse or in Binghamton. 
(57) {John is in Syracuse, John is in Binghamton} 
It seems clear that the presupposition that John is in Syracuse or in 
Binghamton, which is obtained as the disjunction of the alternative set (57), is 
conditionally weakened to the implication showed in (56).  Further, there is an 
intuition that to contextualize (56), one has to imagine a common ground which 
supports the conditionalized implication.  For instance, it could be common 
ground that John is in an electronically monitored parole program which makes it 
impossible for him to visit cities other that Syracuse and Binghamton.  So, with 
and not, we see the compositional transformation of content that is characteristic 21 
of semantic presupposition, and the characteristic pragmatic interpretation of 
entailment by the common ground.  If and not was analyzed with a semantic 
presupposition, then this behavior would fall out.  In a theory using triggering 
from alternative sets, it has to be explained how the same effects follow. 
Putting the point in terms of the alternatives theory, the problem is that in an 
normal utterance context for (56), the some-alternative constraint is not met at the 
global level.  That is, the common ground does not entail that John is in Syracuse 
or in Binghamton.   Indeed with a common ground like that, (56) is odd, because it 
casts doubt on something that is taken for granted.  So, it is not clear how the 
analysis from Section 3 is to be applied. 
Another compositional effect related to presupposition is interaction with 
bound variables in quantified contexts. This is discussed in van der Sandt (1992); 
see also Beaver (1997).  In (58), the and not-phrase includes a bound pronoun.  As 
a consequence, each of the alternatives generated by and not has a bound variable, 
as shown in the description of the alternative set in the last part of the labeled 
bracketing.
  The problem for my analysis is that since each alternative contains a 
variable x2 which is free in the alternative, but bound in the sentence context, it is 
unclear what interpretation the alternative set could get at the discourse level.
24 
(58)  Every one of them is in Worcester, and not his home town. 
 [every one of them]2  
[x2 is in Worcester ∶ x2  is in Worcester ∥ x2  is in x2’s home town]] 
These two problems (presupposition projection and interaction with variable 
binding) are similar, because they involve interactions with compositional 
semantics. Accounts which assume lexical semantic presuppositions have the 
resources to deal with them, because they manipulate denotations which encode 
presuppositions.  Furthermore, since the problems have to do with what is 
happening at embedded levels in the sentence, they seem to involve compositional 
semantics, rather than discourse-level reasoning.  And finally, these phenomena 
have been analyzed in the literature on the compositional semantics of semantic 
presuppositions.  How could the account using triggering from alternative sets do 
as well? 
Some literature on presupposition triggering expresses optimism that 
presuppositions which are triggered in some indirect way (such as by 
conversational implicature) would be filtered and transformed in the same way as 
semantically triggered presuppositions (Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet 1990, p. 
113, Kadmon 2001, p. 216).   The question is how to achieve this in detail in the 
analysis using alternatives for triggering.  This can not follow from any very 
general considerations, because presupposition filtering in semantic accounts is 
the result of certain specific mechanisms and interactions, and there can be no 
general expectation that these mechanisms and interactions would work the same 
way with presuppositions which are the result of an indirect mechanism.  In fact, 
the analysis from Section 3, stated in a way that refers to global QUDs, is an 
example of an indirect triggering mechanism which does not interact with 
compositional semantics to predict filtering and transformation of presuppositions. 22 
    I will approach this problem by re-formulating the theory in dynamic 
semantic terms, taking advantage of the same dynamic compositional interactions 
which are used in semantic accounts of presupposition projection.   In the standard 
picture adopted here, the pragmatic interpretation of presuppositions relates to the 
global common ground (Stalnaker 1974).  On the other hand, in the compositional 
phenomena above, it seems that one has to consider what information is available 
in a local compositional context.  This is what dynamic semantic theories do when 
they check semantic presuppositions against a local information state.  This 
creates a tension between the global and local information levels in the analysis 
which was suggested in Section 3.  To resolve it, I will state the analysis in a way 
which refers to local, compositionally determined information states, and drop the 
assumption that the alternative sets which are used in the derivation are 
necessarily questions under discussion at the discourse level. 
The notion of local, compositionally determined information states is 
illustrated in (59), which is the  compositional rule for conditionals from Heim 
(1983), stated in her file-change notation.  c is an input information state for a 
conditional [if ϕ then ψ].  The formula describes the result of incrementing c with 
a conditional sentence in terms of a binary increment operator ‘+’ and Boolean 
operators.  The formula predicts presupposition transformation because the local 
context for the main clause ψ is the state term c + ϕ rather than c, and ϕ can 
contribute to satisfying the presuppositions of ψ.  The notation d will be used for 
local compositional contexts such as c + ϕ, reserving c for the global information 
state.    
(59) c + if ϕ then ψ = c – ((c+ϕ)  –  (c+ϕ+ψ ))  
Suppose that the clause ψ in (59) contributes an alternative set Q.  The 
discussion of (56) showed that it will not work (or will not always work) to 
impose a default constraint that the global context c entails the disjunction of Q.  
Referring instead to the local context in the constraint on alternatives results in a 
weaker presuppositional constraint, since the local context has the information 
contributed by ϕ, which in (56) is the information that John is in a city.    This will 
result in the same filtering and transformation of presuppositions which is 
obtained with semantic triggering. 
This approach is expressed in a default constraint L stated in (60).
25  The 
constraint is ultimately a constraint on the global information c, and so it has a 
presuppositional character.  But it also refers to the correspondence between c and 
the local context d which is established by compositional semantics.  (61) shows 
how L applies to (56).  γ is the entire sentence, and ψ is the main clause of the 
conditional, which contains and not and contributes the alternative set.  As a result 
of the compositional rule (59), the local context for ψ is the one described in 
(61b).  In the constraint, d is required to entail the disjunction of the alternative set 
(61c).  Since d is defined in terms of c, this provides a constraint on the global 
common ground c which is equivalent to the conditional presupposition shown in 
(56). 23 
(60) Default Constraint L  
If a sentence γ is uttered in a context with common ground c, and γ embeds a 
clause  ψ which contributes an alternative set Q, then c is such that the 
corresponding local context d for ψ entails the disjunction of Q.  
(61) a. [γ [if John is in a city],  [ψ he is in Syracuse and not Binghamton ]] {Q John 
is in Syracuse, John is in Binghamton Q} ψ] γ] 
b. d = c + John is in a city 
c. {in(j,s), in(j,b)} 
Notice that in constraint L, Q is described as an alternative set, not as a 
question under discussion.  An ‘alternative set’ is just a semantic object with the 
type of a set of propositions.  These alternative sets can have a variety of origins:  
an origin in focus semantics, a social institution in the case of contrastive statives, 
a rhetorical pattern in affirmation-negation,  the ordinary denotation in the case of 
questions, or the inchoative operator for inchoative verbs.   Alternative sets with 
these origins can have the role of QUDs, but they do not need to have that role in 
order for L to be triggered.  The constraint is stated in this way because it must 
apply in cases where the alternative set in question is not a global question under 
discussion, for instance (56). 
Although there is no reference to QUDs in L, cases where the alternative set is 
a QUD contribute to the motivation for the constraint.  Questions under discussion 
often obey the some-alternative constraint, and the alternative sets which figure in 
L are often questions under discussion (as in the case of focus in matrix answers, 
and direct questions).  This extends to cases where the trigger for the alternatives 
is in an embedded position.  In (62a), the focus is embedded under negation, but it 
can be motivated by a discourse context where the question ‘who did Mary tell 
about it?’ is topical, and where that question obeys the some-alternative constraint 
relative to the global context c.  In a context like that, (62a) is consistent with L, 
because by virtue of the update rule (62b) for negation, the local context d for the 
embedded clause with the focus is c itself.   
(62) a. Mary didn’t tell JOHNF about it. 
 b. c+ not ϕ = c –  c + ϕ 
So, if one wanted to motivate L as a true statistical generalization, cases like 
these where the alternative set is a QUD provide a bunch of positive cases for the 
generalization.   It is also important that L can also be triggered in cases like (56) 
where the alternative set is not or does not have to be a QUD.  Arguably, when an 
alternative set is contributed in an embedded position by a focus, indirect question, 
affirmation-negation construction, or contrastive stative and is not a QUD, it still 
has a certain discourse-structural role which is shared with matrix questions. I 
would like to claim that there is a linguistic and cognitive phenomenon of 
alternative sets which by default obey the some-alternative constraint relative to a 
local information state.  This phenomenon is instantiated by alternative sets which 
are QUDs, but not limited to them. 24 
    What is the theoretical status of constraint L?  I suggest that it should be 
located in a theory such as the one articulated by Asher and Lascarides (2003), 
where discourse structure is governed by a variety of constraints with a default 
character.
26  An example of this is the default assumption about the temporal order 
of events in (63), which Asher and Lascarides propose is governed by a constraint 
Narration(π1,π2), which requires that the post-state for the event eπ1 described by 
the clause π1  overlap the pre-state of the event eπ2 described by the second 
sentence π2.   
(63)  Max fell.  John helped him up. 
It is an important feature of this theory that contraints interact and compete 
with each other, and can be in effect ‘cancelled’ by contextual information.  This 
is my model for what happens in the cancellation cases from section 1.  Simply 
stated, speakers and hearers will assume that the some-alternative constraint is not 
in force for a particular question variable, if the some-alternative presupposition is 
either inconsistent with context, or made implausible by context.   
 
5. Anaphoricity of Focus 
 This section identifies and fixes a weakness in the argument about focus from 
Section 3.  That discussion used the focus interpretation theory of Rooth (1992), 
but it ignored the important ‘anaphoric’ component of that theory: focus 
interpretation does not just contribute an alternative set, it also requires that the 
alternative set be available as an antecedent in the discourse representation.  The 
requirement for antecedents for focus interpretation is the core of the givenness 
theory of Schwartzschild (1999).   In a focus-triggering question-answer dialogue 
like (64a), the set of propositions introduced by focus interpretation is coindexed 
with the question in the way shown in (64b) in Rooth’s indexing representation.    
(64)    a. Who went to the reception?  BillF went there. 
    b.  [who went to the reception]1 [BillF went there]~1    
There are a couple of ways in which the anaphoric dimension of focus theories 
complicates the picture for the argument of this paper.  First, in a representation 
like (64b), one might wonder whether it is the focus alternative set or the 
antecedent (in this case the question) which is responsible for the existential 
presupposition. Since matrix questions generate default some-alternative 
presuppositions, and (64) has a matrix question as well as a focus,  this example 
does not constitute evidence that focus generates a default some-alternative 
presupposition.   We could say that the presupposition comes from the question, 
and that there is no default constraint which generates a some-alternative 
presupposition from a focus. 
I think this worry is not a very serious one.  In the representation (64b), the 
question is identified with the proposition-set constrained by focus by indexing.   
It does not matter whether the some-alternative constraint applies to the question, 
the focus variable, or both.   To ask which alternative set the some-alternative 
constraint applies to is to create a false distinction, because there is only one 
alternative set.   25 
A second point is that it is easy to construct examples with anaphoric uses of 
focus which do not satisfy a some-alternative constraint.   Consider example (65).  
If one works through the predictions of L, one finds that the conditionalization of 
the presupposition is trivial, so that a default presupposition that someone went 
there is derived.
 But it is easy to think of contexts for the sentence where this 
presupposition is not satified   imagine a scenario where John and Bill are 
exploring a cave that nobody has ever visited before, and ‘there’ refers to a certain 
narrow underwater tunnel. 
(65)   a. If John didn’t go there, I doubt that BillF went there. 
b. If not [John go there]3, I doubt that [BillF went there]~3. 
In the anaphoric focus theories, (65a) gets an analysis like (65b), where the 
antecedent for the focus is the part of the if-clause under the negation.  This 
representation is licensed by the theory of Rooth (1992) because ‘John go there’ 
can be obtained from ‘Bill go there’ by making a substitution in the position of the 
focused subject, and in the theory of Schwarzschild (1999) because John going 
there entails someone going there.
27   
Here it can be pointed out that in both theories, the index 3 has the 
propositional type 〈s,t〉 rather than the question type 〈〈s,t〉,t〉.  As a result, 
constraint L is not triggered at all, and the theory does not predict a default 
existential presupposition for structure (65b).  
A third issue is that the anaphoric part of Schwarzschild’s and Rooth’s focus 
theories represents a lack of analogy between focus and the other soft triggering 
constructions.   For instance, with inchoatives like (66a,b), or a contrastive stative 
like (66c), there is no feeling that the relevant alternative set has to be present in 
the preceding discourse or antecedent discourse representation. 
(66)    a. In the cold snap, the lake froze over. 
 b. Despite the cold snap, the lake didn’t freeze over.   
 c. He doesn’t have a green card. 
A lack of analogy between focus and other soft triggers does not count against 
the analysis using L though, because the theory does not claim that soft triggers 
are similar in every respect, just that soft triggers (or a significant subgroup of 
them) are analogous in the one respect of contributing alterative sets.  The 
constraint L does not require the alternative set Q is either anaphoric or novel, so it 
applies both to anaphoric Q’s (such as certain focus variables) and non-anaphoric 
ones (such as the hypothesized alternative set in the representation of 
inchoatives).
28 
So far, none of these points has undermined in a decisive way the analysis 
using L or the motivation for it which comes from focus data.   However, I think a 
substantial issue can be synthesized from the first two points.   Suppose we adopt 
an anaphoric theory of focus interpretation, say the givenness theory of 
Schwarzschild (1999).  That theory requires a focus to have (in a certain sense) an 
antecedent in the discourse, call it A.   Suppose we say that the antecedency 
constraint exhausts the semantic/pragmatic impact of focus, and that focus  does 
not interact with a constraint like L.  If one takes that position, then it is no 26 
surprise that a focus existential presupposition is sometimes satisfied, and 
sometimes not.  The possible discourse representations divide into three types: 
(i)  A has type 〈〈s,t〉,t〉 and satisfies the some-alternative constraint.  
(ii) A has type 〈〈s,t〉,t〉 and does not satisfy a some-alternative constraint. 
(iii) A has another type such as 〈s,t〉 and the issue of satisfying a some-
alternative constraint does not arise.  
If representations of type (i) are very prevalent compared to representations of 
type (ii), one could claim that this provides motivation for subjecting focus 
alternative sets to a default constraint like L.  But one could also claim that the 
prevalence of representations of type (i) is a fact about the salient antecedents of 
type 〈〈s,t〉,t〉 which happen to be available in discourses: for instance, many of 
these salient antecedents are matrix questions, and matrix questions usually meet 
the some-alternative constraint. 
The objection, then, is that if focus is anaphoric, the antecedents for focus 
alternative sets in particular utterance contexts already decide the question 
whether the some-alternative constraint is satisfied in the particular utterance 
situation or not.  There appears to be little room for a default constraint to favor 
interpretations where the constraint is satisfied over ones where it is not.  
This objection might be strong enough to undo the motivation for constraint L 
coming from focus, if focus is always anaphoric in the sense of there being an 
overt antecedent.  However, it is a commonplace in discussions of anaphoric 
theories of focus that antecedents need not be overt in the discourse (e.g. Rooth 
1992).  Consider the example repeated in (67a).  Certainly this sentence, with a 
focus on the subject she, can be used in a discourse where there is no overt 
antecedent for the focus, such as the question (67b) or the existential clause (67c).  
Rather, the focus can be licensed by the implicit assumption or common 
knowledge that the Trust Company keeps all money and valuables in the vault, so 
that if Lena and Albert robbed it, somebody opened the vault.  When (67a) is used 
in this kind of context, there is no overt discourse antecedent along the lines of the 
question ‘who opened the vault’.   So it is not possible to attribute the 
presuppositional effect to properties that an antecedent happens to have, 
independent of the focus.   There is literally nothing in the overt discourse or in the 
sentence grammar which could be held responsible for the presupposition, except 
for the contrastive accent on the subject she.  Note also that a matrix question like 
(67b) could not be responsible for the conditionalized presupposition which is 
observed in (67a).      
My conclusion is that discourses like this where there is no overt antecedent 
for focus do provide motivation for constraint L. 
(67)   a. If Lena and Albert robbed the Trust Company, then sheF opened the vault. 
b. Who opened the vault? 
c. Someone opened the vault.   
An interesting additional dimension in focus data like this has to do with the 
phonological realization of the scope of the focus on she, i.e. the adjunction site of 
the ~ operator that interprets the F feature.  In (67a) I assumed that the focus scope 27 
was the clause ‘she opened the vault’.  Some literature has claimed when phrases 
in the scope of the focus are not discourse-given, rather than having a flat 
intonation, they are realized with pitch accents  (Selkirk 2002, Fery and Samek-
Lodovici 2006).  When (67a) is used in the context described above, pitch accents 
naturally fall in the positions indicated with capitals in (68), and it is not possible 
to de-accent the VP starting with opened.  Selkirk explicitly argues that the scope 
of the focus feature in examples like this is phonologically detectable, because the 
pitch accent corresponding to the F feature has greater prominence than pitch 
accents in discourse-new material that is not focused.  Thus there might be 
phonological evidence bearing on my claim that the scope of the focus in (67a) is 
the then-clause.
29   
(68) If LEna and ALbert robbed the TRUST Company, then SHE opened the VAULT.        
6.  Other versions of the constraint 
In Section 2, I argued that any indirect account of triggering would have to 
assume some degree of structuring of lexical entries.  I first considered a theory 
where a denotation was structured into a set of entailments, and then in Sections 3 
and 4 developed the theory of triggering from alternative sets.   It was proposed 
that lexical entries can specify alternative sets Q, and that these interact in a 
certain way with the default constraint L.  The constraint always uses an 
alternative set in a specific way  it checks the disjunction of Q against a local 
information state.   Suppose that instead of encoding an alternative set Q, soft 
triggers directly encoded a proposition q which is the disjunction of the alternative 
set Q which is assumed in the formulation from Sections 3 and 4.  If we put q and 
the standard semantic value p together into a set {p,q} which is contributed by the 
compositional semantics for a clause, this almost brings us back to the set-of-
entailments proposal from Section 2.  The difference is that since p 
asymmetrically entails q, there is an inherent ordering on the set, so that it is 
possible for a process which manipulates {p,q} to select q as the presupposed 
entailment.   (69a) is an example.  In the structured semantic value, ‘John is in 
Syracuse’ is the stronger proposition p, and ‘John is in Syracuse or Binghamton’ is 
the weaker proposition q.  
(69)    a. John is in Syracuse rather than Binghamton. 
 b.  {John is in Syracuse, John is in Syracuse or Binghamton} 
The set denotation {p,q} can serve a couple of purposes at once, because the 
standard denotation can be recovered as the conjunction ∧{p,q}=p, while the 
potential presupposition can be recovered as the disjunction ∨{p,q}=q.   Because 
of the latter fact, the appropriate version of constraint L, which is stated in (70), 
looks almost the same as before.   
(70) Default Constraint L’  
If a sentence ψ is uttered in a context with common ground c and ψ embeds 
a clause φ which contributes a denotation set S, then c is such that the 
corresponding local context d for φ entails that the disjunction of S is true.  28 
This version of the alternative-set approach perhaps looks like a formal 
tweaking of the old one, so that there might not be much to decide between them.  
If one wanted to adopt the second approach, one would have to show how to 
extend it to cases like constituent questions, where there can be more than two 
alternatives in Q, and where there is independent evidence about what the 
denotation should be.  
Next I would like to discuss whether, assuming that the analysis using L is 
motivated for certain soft triggers such as focus and affirmation-negation, it is 
attractive to extend it to others soft triggers such as inchoatives, where there is no 
independent evidence for a representation with an alternative set.   If we do 
hypothesize a representation with an alternative set, soft triggering behavior is 
predicted.  This can be seen as an extension of an available mechanism to cover 
additional data.  But it is also unsatisfactory, because it is a way of recording 
status as a soft trigger, in the absence of insight into what lexical feature is 
responsible for soft triggering behavior.   Arguably, instead of mechanically 
applying the alternatives analysis to all soft triggers, we should look for other 
features (presumably, other kinds of structuring) which might be responsible for 
triggering behavior in other classes of soft triggers.      
I will briefly sketch one possibility inspired by Thomason, Stone, and DeVault 
(to appear).
30  In a class of triggers including inchoatives, achievements with 
preparatory phases, and agentive verbs such as sell with preconditions, one can 
independently establish a kind of temporal structuring of the entailments of the 
predicate.  As shown in (71), predicates in these classes are compatible with 
p u n c t u a l  t i m e  a d v e r b s .    I n  t h i s  r e s p e c t, they contrast with predicates in the 
aspectual class of accomplishments: the sentences in (72) are odd because of 
implausible entailments, contradictory, and/or difficult to contextualize.   
(71)   a. He finished the six-mile race at 12:27. 
b. He lost his wallet at 12:27. 
c. He shut down the system at 12:27. 
d. He entered Canada for the first time at 12:27. 
(72)   a. # He ran the race at 12:27. 
b. # He built a house at 12:27. 
c. # He spent two weeks in Canada at 12:27. 
The sentences in (71) do have entailments about the time period prior to 
12:27–it is not that all of the information entailed by the sentence is about the time 
point 12:27.  For instance (71d) entails that he was not in Canada at any time 
before 12:27, and (71c) entails that the system was up shortly before 12:27.   As a 
baseline theory, say that verbs in the achievement class have an entailment s 
describing an event which is located within the time parameter which interacts 
with temporal frame adverbs, and an entailment r describing a preparatory process 
or pre-condition that is located prior to the time frame described by a temporal 
frame adverb, rather than within it.  Syntactically, suppose we use a formula 
constructor  T which in the formula rTs constructs a proposition in the 
achievement class from a formula r describing the precondition, and a formula s 
describing the change.  T is like von Wright’s operator T, except for the possible 29 
difference that the logic and compositional semantics should be set up so that 
when rTs is modified by a temporal frame adverb, s rather than the sequence r,s 
gets located within the temporal frame.
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With these assumptions, a particular representation rTs for predications such 
as achievements and changes of state is motivated by frame adverb modification 
and other criteria developed on literature on aspectual classification (Kenny 1963, 
Dowty 1979, Krifka 1992).  These criteria are independent of presupposition 
phenomena.   Consider now how the defeasible presuppositions of predications in 
the achievement class should be derived.  In the approaches considered so far, one 
would state a semantics for rTs which introduced an alternative set {rTs,r} or a 
set denotation {rTs, rTs ∨ r}.   Then application of constraint L (the alternatives 
constraint) or constraint L’ (the set-denotation constraint) results in checking that 
the local information state entails the precondition.  That is, one obtains a default 
presuppositional status for the precondition. 
One could also proceed more directly, and state a default constraint like (73) 
referring to preconditions, and try to motivate that constraint.  (73) handles the 
facts of presupposition projection in exactly the same way as L.     
(73)   Presuppositions from preconditions 
If a sentence ψ is uttered in a context with common ground c and ψ embeds 
a clause φ with precondition r, then c is such that the corresponding local 
context d for φ entails r.  
To apply the constraint, one needs a semantic model where it is possible to 
recover the preconditions of the embedded clause φ.  If that can be worked out, I 
don’t see a reason to prefer an analysis using alternatives to the one referring 
directly to preconditions.   
7.  Conclusion 
The argument of this paper can be summarized like this.  (i) There are various 
‘soft’ presupposition triggers, where triggering behavior is defeasible.  (ii) For 
some of these triggers, a representation involving alternatives is motivated, and for 
these it is attractive to derive presupposition triggering from the alternatives.  (iii) 
An account of presupposition filtering and transformation can be adapted from 
Heim (1983), and the whole analysis can be expressed as a default constraint L 
which refers to logical forms that contribute alternative sets. (iv) For triggers 
where we have not found any independent motivation for a representation with 
alternatives, once we have L, we can derive soft triggering anyway, by stipulating 
a lexical representation with a set of alternatives whose disjunction is the observed 
presupposition.  (v) But perhaps, where a representation using alternatives is not 
independently motivated, it is better to look for a different constraint referring to 
some lexical feature which is motivated.  An example is a constraint referring to 
preconditions.  
Part (iii) is in one way a modest success: the basic mechanism for 
presupposition filtering is identical to what is found in dynamic semantics, and 
from this point of view there is little independent interest to it.   But this can also 
be seen the other way around: in the alternatives analysis, it is easy to deal with 30 
presupposition filtering by using the mechanisms of dynamic semantics.  So the 
facts of presupposition filtering are not a barrier to the alternatives analysis, or 
more generally, to indirect analyses of presupposition triggering.   
The overall program being advocated here is one of tying presupposition-
triggering behavior to motivated features of lexical semantics, constructional 
semantics, or pragmatic status which are not inherently presuppositional.  This 
paper has made a case for a derivation from alternatives, focusing on a handful of 
constructions.  If this kind of approach is correct, it is plausible that the full story 
would involve a number of distinct features which can be responsible for soft 
triggering behavior. 
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Notes 
1. Simons (2001) identified achievements like win as soft triggers in my sense.  
The general setting of Simon’s paper is the same as this one, with a group of 
soft triggers being identified, and then with triggering being attributed to an 
indirect mechanism.  This paper looks at a largely different group of soft 
triggers that motivate the alternatives analysis. 
2.  Here ‘implication’ is used as a cover term for presuppositions, logical 
entailments, and conversational implicatures.  I sometimes use the notation ‘p > 
q’ for ‘q is an implication of p’. 31 
3.  The pragmatic test is used here not as a definition of presupposition, but as one 
of a group of linguistic tests which tend to correlate.  Arguably, most of the 
linguistic theory of presupposition would be the same if presupposition was not 
interpreted as entailment by the common ground. Matthewson (2006) argues 
that in the St’át’imcets language, linguistic presuppositions do not have the 
common-ground pragmatics. 
4. I would like to hedge the claim of a contrast between (12a) and (12b) in two 
ways.  First, I have the impression that the second sentence in (12a) is licensed 
by the fact that the first sentence presents it as possible for John to miss the 
meeting. If one makes this sort of context more explicit, even the cleft version 
becomes fully good: 
(i)  Bill was ordered to be at the meeting, and John was permitted to attend or 
to miss it. As it turned out, it was Bill who missed it.   
Second, the discourse in (12b) with the cleft in fact seems fine to some 
speakers.  Perhaps these speakers are readily able to imagine a discourse 
structure like the one in (i). 
5.  One point raised by Horn is that the presupposition can be obviated by an if-
phrase as in (i), which seems to indicate satisfaction of a genuine 
presupposition, rather than some kind of cancellation.  These data turn out to be 
consistent with the analysis proposed in Section 4. 
(i) John wonders who if anyone will vote for him. 
6. An interesting point about (16) and (17) is that an analysis using semantic 
presupposition plus accommodation will not work.  In (17), there is no space for 
local accommodation, because the question is a top-level one, and a global 
accommodation of the existential presupposition is inconsistent with the second 
sentence.  In (16a) there might be space for local accommodation within the 
attitude predicate, but it seems this would give the wrong result, a 
presupposition that the speaker believes that someone will vote for her.  
7. Section 5 argues that (19b) is actually irrelevant, but that (20a) is genuine 
evidence for an existential presupposition of focus. 
8. See Jäger (2004) and Kratzer (2004) for related discussion. 
9.  Important progress on factive and semifactive verbs is made in Simons (2007).  
She shows that in evidential contexts like (i) where the factive implication is at 
issue, the factive implication is systematically not presupposed.   
(i)  Why isn’t Louise coming to our meetings these days? 
Henry discovered that she’s left town. 
This is evidence for ‘softness’ of triggering by factives (or semi-factives).  The 
theory being criticized in the text leads us to expect that there would be 
discourse contexts where the attitude entailment comes out presupposed for 
discover or know.  32 
10.  Fillmore discusses pairs like accuse/blame for.  Know/be right and sell/get 
money for are my own additions. 
11. This kind of structured lexical representation for sell is articulated in 
Jackendoff (1990). 
12. In Section 6, working backwards from my alternative-semantics theory, I 
show that by making the right choice for p and r in a structured denotation 
{p,r}, one can solve this problem.  The general point is that ϕ1 and ϕ2 could be 
represented by different sets {p1,p2,…} and {q1,q2,…}, with p1∧p2∧…≡ 
q1∧q2∧… .  
13.  But see Section 6.  There I sketch a theory which tries to attribute triggering 
to an aspectual distinction which is reflected in patterns of truth with respect to 
intervals in interval semantics.  Arguably this is not a matter of structuring, but 
of a theory of triggering which refers to aspectual distinctions. I don’t think that 
approach would be able to distinguish sell from get money for.    
14. See Section 5 for some discussion of how things come out if we assume the 
givenness theory of Schwarzschild (1999), or consider representations licensed 
by the theory of Rooth (1992) where the antecedent for focus has a 
propositional type, rather than a question type.  
15. The difference at most is in how the proposition set in the two cases is located 
in the system of semantic values.  See Rooth (1985) and Beck (2006).   
16. Getting from (41a) to (40) in a derivation for (39d) requires a logic where 
lambda conversion and intensionality interact with alternatives in the right way.  
Solutions have been developed in literature on alternative semantics for focus 
and questions (Rooth 1985, Ch. 2, and Shan 2004).  The appendix to this paper 
outlines an adaptation of Rooth’s solution to my notation.   
17. Expressions like (45) are given a meaning in typed logics for presupposition 
such as Beaver and Krahmer (2001). ∂ is the presupposition operator.   
18. Beaver (2004b) pointed out that an alternatives analysis would be motivated 
by cases where the alternatives vary with context.  There is a technical issue of 
how to fit contextually determined alternatives into the architecture where 
alternatives are introduced with operators as in (42b) and (43).  Applying a 
standard architecture with context variables (Stanley 2000), one needs some 
kind of context variable and an operator which can optionally add expressions 
that introduce alternative sets.  If following the pattern of (43) the target is 
λx[∃y[greencard(y)∧have(x,y)] ∶ ∃y[greencard(y)∧have(x,y)] ∥  Ai{x}], where 
Ai is a context variable of property type, then the operator that introduces 
alternatives is λQλx[Q{x} ∶ Q{x} ∥  Ai{x}].  It combines with the denotation of 
have a green card.  The variable Ai has a property type because the contextual 
alternative is a property, not an extensional set.    In this formal shell of an 
analysis, the alternative is introduced at a compositional level, rather than a 33 
lexical one.  If one is willing to think informally, it seems clear that it is have a 
green card rather than have or green card that has a salient alternative.   
19. Dowty (1979) stated this semantics for T, using an interval semantics 
framework where denotations are relative to time intervals. 
[ϕTψ] is true at an interval I iff (1) there is an interval J containing the 
lower bound of I such that ϕ is true at J and ψ is false at J, (2) there is an 
interval K containing the upper bound of I such that ψ is true at K and ψ 
is false at K, and (3) there is no non-empty interval I’⊂I such that (1) and 
(2) hold for I’ as well as for I. 
He defines an inchoative operator as [BECOME ϕ] = [¬ϕTϕ]. This agrees with 
my discussion.  Explaining notation like that in (49) and (50) requires 
integrating interval semantics with a typed intensional logic of alternatives.  I 
haven’t thought about this, except to guess that time intervals should be treated 
as worlds are treated in Rooth (1985) or Shan (2004). On this, see the appendix. 
20.  It needs to be established whether there are aspectual differences.  Initially I 
thought that the and then … not complex was bad with punctual adverbs, unlike 
with inchoatives like (i).  But (ii) is perhaps relatively OK. 
(i) At 2:13, the patient woke up. 
(ii) At 2:13, the patient was asleep and then awake and not simply asleep. 
21.  The predicted projected presupposition is that the nurse believes the patient 
was asleep.  As in (46b), one can also perceive the strengthened presupposition 
that the patient was asleep. 
22. Since I have not described an integration of interval semantics as in Dowty 
(1979) with a typed logic of presupposition, (51) is no more than a guess at the 
appropriate definition of a presuppositional inchoative.  
23. The twins examples are from Heim (1983), who credits them to personal 
communication from Stanley Peters.  Although (or perhaps because) the 
conditional presupposition is so bizarre, I find these data clear.  The pragmatic 
prediction is that (54) should be usable only in a context where the common 
ground entails the conditionalized presupposition, and this seems right.  For 
instance, it could be common ground that John is a member of a species (a kind 
of armadillo) whose firstborns are always twins.  Then if John has any children 
at all, he has some twins.   In this paper, clefts rather than definite descriptions 
are the paradigm example of hard triggers.  The cleft version (i) of the bank 
robbery example illustrates conditional transformation with clefts. 
(i) If John and Mary robbed the Trust Company, then it is she who opened 
the vault.  
> If John and Mary robbed the Trust Company, then someone opened 
the vault. 
24. The point being made here does not have to do with the restricting domains of 
quantification to satisfy presuppositions.  According to some intuitions, in (i) the 34 
domain gets restricted to Germans who have Mercedes automobiles.  This 
matter is independent of the point I am bringing up about (58).  No matter how 
the domain is restricted, one alternative in (58) contains a bound variable his. 
(i) Every German likes his Mercedes.  
25. This analysis has a certain connection with the analysis of soft triggering in 
Simons (2001), which refers to this Question raising principle.  
If A says S, and S embeds q, then A raises the question whether q. 
Both theories use the idea that embedded clauses can raise (or in my case, refer 
to) questions.   A problem from the point of view of the theory being developed 
here is that a whether-question Q derived from a non-presuppositional 
proposition q will derive a trivial some-alternative presupposition.  See a 
prepublication version of this paper (doi:1813/12212) for some discussion of 
Simons’ pragmatic derivation. 
26.  Other possible theoretical settings for L are I-implicature (Levinson 2000), 
and enrichment reasoning (Carston 2002). 
27. The theories of Rooth (1992) and Schwarzschild (1999) both license 
representations with propositional antecedents, in addition to representations 
with proposition-set antecedents.  Formally, Schwarzschild’s givenness theory 
does not refer to indices. Instead it requires that salient antecedents be present. 
28. Still, it must be recalled that this paper has stated no independent evidence that 
inchoatives contribute alternative sets.  If they contributed anaphoric alternative 
sets, that would be detectable, providing evidence for the representation. 
29. There are other representational and analytic possibilities, however. One 
alternative, pointed out to me by David Beaver, is that grammatical focus on she 
has a narrower scope, expressing simply a contrast between Lena and Abner.  In 
the indexing theory, this might be represented as [[sheF ~1] opened the vault], 
where 1 is an index with value {Lena, Albert}.  This would presumably not 
predict a conditionalized presupposition along the lines of the one I am 
discussing, or entail that the subject she is more prominent than the predicate 
opened the vault. Another possibility is that the accent on vault, rather than 
being the kind of accent characteristic of discourse-new material in Selkirk's 
analysis, is a topic accent in the sense of Büring (1997). The Focus-Topic 
combination would contribute an implicit discourse structure along the lines of 
‘what about opening the vault? Who did that?’ or ‘who performed what action 
involved in robbing the Trust Company?’.  
30.  The commentary Abusch and Rooth (2006) criticized Thomason, Stone, and 
DeVault’s paper for not explaining what the concepts of presupposition and 
precondition have to do with each other, almost as if there was a terminological 
confusion. Now it seems to me that reducing triggering of linguistic 
presuppositions to features with independent character and motivation is exactly 
right.   35 
31.  See footnote 19. 
 
 
Appendix 
The definition in (42c) is intended to generate the propositional alternative set 
{Abner read the letter, Lena read the letter} at the level of the first sentence in 
(42a).  This appendix sketches a logic for such expressions. 
 
(42)   a.  Abner and not Lena read the letter.  And perhaps Lena read it too. 
b.  AbnerF read the letter.  And perhaps Lena read it too. 
c.〚and not〛= λyλxλP[ P(x) ∧ ¬P(y) ∶ P(x) ∥  P(y) ] 
d.〚and not〛 (y) (x)(P)  = P(x) ∧ ¬P(y), with the alternative set {P(x), P(y)} 
introduced. 
My approach is to simplify alternative semantics for focus so that alternatives 
propagate less.  In alternative semantics for focus, alternatives can propagate past 
functions, because there is the need to generate wide-scope alternatives for 
focused phrases in embedded positions.  (i) is an example.  To propagate 
alternatives, recursive rules for alternative sets are used that define a ‘focus 
semantic value’ [[…]]
f, together with the ordinary semantic value [[…]]
o.  (ii) is the 
simplest version of the recursive semantic rule for focus semantic values for 
function/argument terms. This definition of the focus semantic value [[α(β)]]
f of a 
function term α(β) propagates alternatives from both the function sub-term α and 
the argument sub-term β. 
(i) Sue wants JOHNF to marry her. [She doesn’t want Bill to marry her.] 
(ii) [[α(β)]]
f  = { x(y) | x∈[[α]]
f ∧ y∈[[β]]
f }  
If lexically triggered alternatives also propagated from the argument part of 
application terms, one would get the alternative set (iv) for (iii), where the 
alternatives coming from freeze have propagated past the function impossible.  
This is undesirable, because the disjunction of (iv) isn’t a presupposition of (iii).  
(iii) It’s impossible that the pool water froze.  This is Tel Aviv! 
(iv) {it’s impossible that the pool water was liquid and became frozen, 
it’s impossible that the pool water was liquid and remained liquid} 
So, lexically triggered alternatives should not propagate from the argument 
part of an application term.  They should propagate from the function part, 
because for instance in (42), the alternatives {Abner read the letter, Lena read the 
letter} should be generated from the denotation (42c) for and not, which has a 
functional type and contributes the alternatives.  In fact all the examples in the 
paper follow this pattern: a lexical item denoting a function and contributing an 
alternative set should be ‘filled out’ to set of alternative propositions, by adding 
arguments. This suggests the definition (v), where [[…]]
a is a semantic value 36 
function for lexically triggered alternatives, and [[…]]
o is the ordinary semantic 
value.   
(v)    [[α(β)]]
a  = { x(y) | x∈[[α]]
a ∧ y = [[β]]
o } 
Since lambda is used in (42c) and other definitions of triggers in the paper, a 
semantics for abstraction is also needed.  There are proposals for this in literature 
on alternative semantics for focus (Rooth 1985, Shan 2004).  (vi) is Rooth’s 
solution applied to the alternatives value [[…]]
a.  All semantic values have 
additional argument positions for assignment functions and for worlds.  (vii) is (v) 
adjusted to the raised types.  (viii) defines the alternative value for the intension 
operator.  Other clauses should not propagate alternatives, e.g. (ix).  (x) defines the 
alternative semantic value of an atomic symbol as the unit set of the ordinary 
semantic value. 
 
(vi) [[λx.α]]
a  = {λgλwλy.f(g[y/x])(w) | f ∈[[α]]
a }  
(vii) [[α(β)]]
a  = {λgλw.x(g)(w)(y(g)(w)) | x ∈[[α]]
a ∧ y = [[β]]
o } 
(viii) [[^α]]
a  = {λgλwλv.f(g)(v) | f ∈[[α]]
a } 
(ix) [[ϕ∧ψ]]
a  = {[[ϕ∧ψ]]
o} 
(x)  [[α]]
a  = {[[α]]
o}, where α is atomic. 
 
Finally, here is the clause for the operator that initiates the alternative set.  
(xi)  [[ϕ ∶ ψ1    ∥ … ∥ ψn  ]]
a  = {[[ψ1]]
o, … , [[ψn]]
o} 
This operator does not affect ordinary denotations: 
(xii)  [[ϕ ∶ ψ1    ∥ … ∥ ψn  ]]
o  = [[ϕ]]
o 
In this system, where ϕ is a formula, [[ϕ]]
a  has type [[Assignments → 
Worlds → Bool] → Bool], while the ordinary semantic value [[ϕ]]
o  has type 
[Assignments  → Worlds → Bool].   A set of propositions (characteristic 
functions of worlds) is recovered from [[ϕ]]
a using a contextual assignment g as 
{f(g) | f ∈[[ϕ]]
a}. 
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